Power system functionality is determined by the evaluation of the power system state estimation (PSSE). Thus, corruption of the PSSE may lead to severe consequences, such as financial losses, substantial maintenance damage, and disruptions in the electricity distribution. Classical bad data detection (BDD) methods, developed to ensure PSSE reliability, are unable to detect well-designed attacks, named unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks. In this paper we develop novel sparse methods for the detection of unobservable FDI attacks and for the identification of the attacked buses' locations. Furthermore, the proposed methods can be used for estimation of the attack's extent. Hence, it also enables evaluation of the PSSE by removing the estimated attack from the measurements. The proposed methods are based on formulating structural, sparse constraints on both the attack and the load demand. First, we exploit these constraints in order to compose an appropriate model selection problem. Then, we develop the associated generalized information criterion (GIC) for this problem, which is widely employed in signal processing. For large networks, the GIC selection method is time consuming with computational complexity that grows exponentially with the network size. Thus, we develop two low-complexity methods: 1) an orthogonal matching pursuit (OMP)-based method that relies on the proposed structural and sparse constraints; and 2) a new method that exploits the graph Markovian property of order two of the graph representation of the electricity network, i.e. the second-neighbor relationship between the power system buses. The performance of the proposed methods is evaluated on IEEE standard test systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ODERN electrical grids are continuously controlled by energy management systems (EMS). The EMS evaluates the power system state estimation (PSSE) for multiple monitoring purposes, including stability assessment, control, and security [1] , [2] . The PSSE is computed based on measurements that are transmitted from meters deployed in the network. In order to ensure the reliability of the measurements, residual-based detection methods have been developed as an integral part of the PSSE in the EMS [1] . However, classical, residual-based, bad data detection (BDD) methods cannot detect well-designed attacks, named unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks [3] , [4] . Unobservable FDI attacks are achieved by manipulating measurements based on the power network topology [3] , where the topology matrix can be estimated by analyzing system measurements [5] - [11] . Unobservable FDI attacks may inflict severe economic and hardware damage by influencing the PSSE [12] - [16] . Therefore, appropriate tools for the detection, identification, and estimation of these attacks, that ensure the reliability of the PSSE, are crucial for obtaining high power quality and maintaining stable power system operation.
Several attempts to solve the problem of the detection of unobservable FDI attacks have been proposed in the literature. Methods that strategically protect a basic set of measurements were proposed in [17] - [22] . In the same context, the use of synchronized phasor measurement units (PMUs) has been suggested [21] , [23] , [24] . However, these approaches require additional hardware that may result in high cost and a long installation period, and may cause other security vulnerabilities [25] - [27] . Detection by the moving target defense method, in which the system configuration is actively changed, has been proposed in [28] - [31] . However, in this method, effective attack detection carries the cost of operating far from the optimal state and, thereby, incurring economic losses [32] . Detection based on machine learning and data mining have been suggested in [33] , [34] , but these methods require a large set of historic data, which is usually unavailable. Detection using load forecasting has been suggested in [35] , [36] , but obtaining a reliable forecast is not always possible and may require extensive resources [37] . Sparse optimization techniques are suggested in [22] and [38] , but require restrictive assumptions, for instance that there are multiple time measurements and at each time the attack takes place at different buses. In conclusion, all the above mentioned methods require additional hardware, a large amount of historical data, or restrictive assumptions, and, thus, cannot serve as practical solutions for the detection of unobservable FDI attacks in current power systems. Moreover, there is no existing method for unobservable FDI attack identification, i.e. the localization of the attacked buses, and for PSSE evaluation in the presence of this attack.
In [39] , [40] we have shown that anomalies caused by unobservable FDI attacks can be detected by using the Graph Fourier Transform (GFT) in the context of graph signal processing (GSP) tools. In this work, we suggest a novel compressive sensing (CS) approach that not only has better detection performance than the GSP method in [39] , [40] , but also provides identification of the attacked buses, an estimation of the attack, and a modified PSSE that reduces estimation errors caused by the attack. Reconstruction of sparse signals and CS techniques have become a foremost research area in the last two decades (see e.g. [41] - [43] and references therein). In power systems, CS algorithms [44] have been proposed in the context of multi-line outage identification in transmission networks [45] - [47] , gross error identification [48] , identification of imbalances [49] , and BDD [50] .
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we formulate structural and sparse constraints for both the attack and the change in power consumption between two consecutive time samples. Accordingly, we represent the attack by a sparse number of dictionary elements, i.e. the topology matrix columns. Next, since the typical load change cannot be approximated by a sparse number of dictionary elements, we formulate a model selection problem, where in each model the attack is assumed to be represented by a different set of dictionary elements. Based on the model selection formulation and the generalized information criterion (GIC) selection rule [51] , we develop structure-constrained methods for the detection, identification, and estimation of unobservable FDI attacks. As a by-product, the proposed method can be used for obtaining the PSSE by removing the estimated attack. However, the proposed GIC-based method requires an exhaustive search that grows exponentially with the network scale. Therefore, for large networks we develop two low-complexity methods: 1) a method that is based on the state-of-the-art orthogonal matching pursuit (OMP) algorithm [52] that relies on the proposed structural and sparse constraints; and 2) a new method that is based on the graph Markovian property of order two, i.e. second-neighbor relationship [53] . Finally, we show by numerical simulation that the proposed GIC, OMP, and GM-GIC methods outperform the detection performance of existing methods. Simulations show that the attacked buses can be identified, which enables the PSSE evaluation.
A. Organization and notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the background on the model of the power flow equations, BDD, and unobservable FDI attacks. In Section III we present our approach for the detection and identification of unobservable FDI attacks. In Section IV we develop two low-complexity methods for large networks. In Section V a simulation study is presented. Finally, the paper ends with conclusions in Section VI.
In the rest of this paper vectors are denoted by boldface lowercase letters and matrices are denoted by boldface uppercase letters. The operators ||·|| and ||·|| 0 denote the second norm and the zero seminorm, respectively, where the latter specifies the number of non-zero elements in the vector. The operators (·) T and (·) −1 denote the transpose and inverse operators, respectively. The projection and the orthogonal projection operators for a matrix A ∈ R M ×K with a full column rank are given by
The linear space spanned by the A matrix columns is denoted by col(A). For any index set, Λ ⊂ {1, . . . , L}, θ Λ is the |Λ|dimensional subvector of θ containing the elements indexed by Λ, where |Λ| denotes the set's cardinality. For any two index sets, Λ 1 and Λ 2 , A Λ1,Λ2 is the submatrix composed by the columns and rows of A associated with the index sets Λ 1 and Λ 2 , respectively. The submatrix A Λ1,: is composed of the A matrix rows corresponding to the index set Λ 1 , while the submatrix A :,Λ2 is composed of the A matrix columns corresponding to the index set Λ 2 .
II. BACKGROUND

A. DC model
The power system network can be defined by a set of buses, V = {0, 1, . . . N }, and a set of transmission lines, which is denoted by E. Each transmission line connects two buses, where the transmission line connecting buses n ∈ V and k ∈ V is denoted by the pair (n, k) ∈ E. Furthermore, according to the π-model of transmission lines [1] , each line, (n, k) ∈ E, is characterized by an admittance, Y n,k . Based on this representation, the DC power flow model, which is a linearized representation of the power measurements in the power system, is considered with the following assumptions: a.1 Branches are considered without resistance losses, which results in Y n,k = B n,k , where B n,k is the susceptance of the (n, k) transmission line. a.2 The bus voltage magnitudes, V n , n = 1, 2, . . . , N , are approximated by 1 per unit (p.u.). a.3 The differences in bus voltage angle between adjacent buses are assumed to be small such that:
Based on Assumptions a.1-a.3, the DC model of the active power injections in the buses is given by [1] :
∀ n ∈ V. Similarly, the DC model of the active power flows in the transmission lines satisfies
In this paper we assume that there are given active power measurements, denoted by z = [z 1 , · · · , z M ] T ∈ R M , that include the power injections in (1) and the power flows in (2) . In addition, θ = [θ 1 , ..., θ N ] T denotes the state vector and includes the bus voltage angles at all buses except the slack bus. Accordingly, the matrix-form noisy and attacked DC power flow model can be written as:
where the topology matrix, H, is a constant M × N Jacobian matrix, which is composed of the susceptance elements, B n,k , in equations (1) and (2) (as described, for example, in [54] ). In addition, e ∈ R M is a zero-mean Gaussian additive noise vector with covariance matrix R, i.e. e ∼ N (0, R). The attack is denoted by a ∈ R M . Usually, it is assumed that the adversary has the ability to manipulate up to K a << M meters [54] . Therefore, in this paper we assume that
i.e. the attack vector, a, is sparse and has at most K a nonzero entries.
B. Power system state estimation (PSSE)
The PSSE is implemented by using meter measurement data from (3) . In addition, it is typically computed as a weighted least squares (WLS) estimator [1] :
where
In order to robustify the PSSE against errors, classical BDD methods are implemented in the EMS [1] . These BDD methods are based on the residual error,
where the last equality is obtained by substituting the estimated state vector as defined in (5) . The residual error from (7) is used, for example, in the Largest Normalized Residual r N maxtest and the χ 2 -test [1] , also referred to as the J(x)-detector, which is given by:
where H 1 is the hypothesis that bad data is assumed, maybe as a result of an attack, and H 0 is the null hypothesis. The threshold, γ BDD , is determined so as to obtain a desired false alarm rate. However, both the Largest Normalized Residual, which is an identification method, and the χ 2 -test, which is a detection method, are inappropriate for unobservable FDI attacks, as described in the next subsection.
C. Unobservable FDI attacks
The unobservable FDI attack satisfies
where c ∈ R N is an arbitrary constant vector. By substituting the well-designed attack from (9) in the observation model from (3) we obtain
From a comparison between the models in (3) and in (10) it can be verified that by observing z one cannot distinguish between the state vector, θ, and its corrupted version caused by an injected state attack, θ + c, where both θ and c are unknown vectors. That is, the estimator of the state vector, θ, based on (10), is biased and is identical to the estimator in (5) , which was developed under the no-attack scenario from (3) . As a result, by using the unobservable FDI model in (10) and the WLS estimation, the residual error in (7) satisfies
Thus, the residual error does not provide information on the presence of an unobservable FDI attack. Consequently, all residual-based methods, as well as all the other methods that are based solely on the model in (10) , will fail to detect unobservable FDI attacks. Therefore, new methods for the identification of manipulated measurements that integrate additional structural and physical constraints are required. It should be noted that data-based methods can be used to detect unobservable FDI attacks if those attacks differ significantly from the typical feasible region of the measurements. For example, one may suggest the use of the following conventional energy detector:
where γ ENG is a chosen threshold. However, this energy detector is not sensitive enough for attack detection, as demonstrated in the simulations in Section V.
III. STRUCTURE BASED APPROACH FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF UNOBSERVABLE FDI ATTACKS
Considering the unobservable FDI attack formation and further sparsity restrictions, the additional power caused by the attack is constrained to a small subset of buses in the network. Therefore, in this section a new framework that is based on observing power changes in small subnetworks of the system is proposed. First, the new model is developed in Subsection III-A. Then, in Subsection III-B, we develop a novel identification method for unobservable FDI attacks based on the new framework. By using the identification solution, in Subsection III-C we develop a method for PSSE in the presence of an attack. It should be noted that the proposed framework is designed specifically for unobservable FDI attacks with the associated measurement model from (10) . For the general case of both unobservable attacks, random attacks, and bad data, the measurement can be preprocessed by conventional BDD methods that remove conventional faulty measurements. Then, the reconstructed measurements at the output of the conventional PSSE can be used as the input measurement for our approach.
A. Structural-constrained model for unobservable FDI attacks
The proposed framework, which facilitates structural constraints on the unobservable FDI attack and on the typical load demand, is constructed by applying the following definitions and assumptions: A.1 Difference-based model: In a similar manner to in [35] , two consecutive time samples are observed, where the first time sample is considered to be free from malicious attacks and the second may contain an unobservable FDI attack. A.2 Restricted measurements: Since generator buses are heavily secured and have direct communication with the control center [55] , we assume that generator bus measurements could not be manipulated. Similarly, it is assumed that 'zero load' measurements cannot be manipulated. Therefore, the set of buses that can be attacked only includes the load buses, and is denoted by L, where L ⊂ V. A.3 State sparsity: The number of manipulated state variables is sparse, and is assumed to be smaller than K c , i.e ||c|| 0 ≤ K c . This assumption stems directly from the sparsity restriction on manipulated network meters, defined in (4), as shown in the simulation section in [3] . Thus, we define the set
which includes all possible supports of c associated with all possible unobservable FDI attacks. A.4 Typical loads change: Power systems could be regarded as quasi-static systems with slight changes over a short time [56] . Therefore, a relatively small change in the loads measurements is considered. In addition, the typical loads change w.r.t. the actual buses' load measurements at a specific moment is determined by the change in the consumption demand [57] , and, thus, this change can be considered to be non-sparse and non-related to the system topology matrix.
It can be seen that Assumptions A.1-A.3 define structural constraints on the attack, while Assumption A.4 defines a structural constraint on the typical loads change. From Assumption A.1, the difference-based model is achieved by taking the difference between two consecutive time samples that satisfy the model in (10) , with c = 0 for the first time sample and an arbitrary c in the second time sample. Thus, the difference-based observation model is given by:
where ∆θ is the change in the state vector, θ, between the two time samples. Furthermore, by assuming that the noises of the two consecutive time samples are independent, we obtain that the difference-based measurement noise in (14) is distributed in accordance with ∆e ∼ N (0, 2R), where, for the sake of simplicity, we assume 2R = σ 2 e I. According to Assumption A.2, only the changes in the load buses' measurements are relevant for the attack. Thus, the relevant measurement model for the detection of attacks is obtained by taking only the load measurements from (14) , which results in
where ∆z L is the change in load measurements, H L,: is the associated submatrix of the topology matrix H, and ∆e L is the corresponding noise. Assumption A.3 states that the state attack vector support, Λ, is in the set G Kc . Therefore, there exists an element Λ i ∈ G Kc , where i = 1, 2, · · · , |G Kc |, such that the attack on the load measurements is given by:
where |Λ i | << |V|. By substituting (16) in (15) we obtain
Furthermore, Assumption A.4, implies that the power of the unattacked loads change without noise, H L,: ∆θ, is bounded. This assumption can be mathematically formulated as:
where η is a system tuning parameter that can be obtained from the power system statistics, based on historical values. In addition, from Assumption A.4, H L,: ∆θ cannot be represented as a sparse combination of the columns of the submatrix, H L,Λi , for any Λ i ∈ G Kc . Therefore, it is assumed that the projection of H L,: ∆θ onto the column space of the submatrix, H L,Λi , results in a significant loss in power as follows:
is the projection matrix to the space col(H L,Λi ). The combination of the inequalities in (18) and (19) implies that
The inequalities in (21) and (22) show that the projection of H L,: ∆θ on col(H L,Λi ) is small w.r.t. the network parameters. In contrast, by using the properties of projection matrices it can be verified that the projection of H L,Λi c Λi onto the space of the attack support remains unchanged, i.e.
Accordingly, the projection of the measurement vector in (17) onto col(H L,Λi ), which is a smaller subnetwork of the system, satisfies
where the last equality is obtained by substituting (23). It can be seen that the projected measurement vector in (24) is the sum of the noise and two terms: 1) additional power caused due to the attack, H L,Λi c Λi , which is not affected by the projection onto col(H L,Λi ), as described in (23); and 2) the projection of the unattacked loads change without noise, P Λi H L,: ∆θ, which suffers a significant decrease in power due to the said projection, as described in (21) . Therefore, (21) and (23) imply that the attack, H L,Λi c Λi , is significantly larger than the projected loads component P Λi H L,: ∆θ, i.e.
By applying the property in (25) in (24) we obtain that the projected measurement vector can be approximated by
Now, from the properties of projection matrices, it can be verified (see, e.g. p. 25 in [58] ) that the measurement vector in (17) can be uniquely decomposed into:
where P ⊥ Λi = I − P Λi is the orthogonal projection matrix, the second equality is obtained by substituting (23) , and the approximation is obtained by substituting (26) . It can be seen that in the new, approximated model in (27) , the attack component, H L,Λi c Λi , and the orthogonally projected loads component, P ⊥ Λi H L,: ∆θ, belong to orthogonal subspaces, and therefore are separable. This decomposition is the basis for the development of the proposed identification methods that are performed by testing each optional attack subspace and, thus, making the FDI attacks observable in the relevant subspace.
B. Identification of unobservable FDI attacks
Based on the model from (27), the task of identifying the subset of attacked buses, Λ i , can be done by selecting from amongst the multiple hypotheses:
where each hypothesis H i in (28) assumes a different support Λ i ∈ G Kc for the state attack vector c, and the null hypothesis H 0 is obtained by substituting c = 0 in (15). In the following method, we derive the identification of unobservable FDI attacks by selecting the most likely hypothesis in (28), given the measurement vector ∆z L . That is, we find the most suitable choice of attack support, Λ i , from the set of candidate supports, {G Kc ∪ ∅}, that provides the "best" description of the observations, ∆z L .
Selecting the most likely hypothesis in (28) is done by using the GIC selection rule [51] , which is widely employed in signal and array processing. The GIC method chooses the hypothesis H i which maximizes the sum of two terms: the likelihood term for data encoding, evaluated at the ML points, L(·), and a penalty function, τ (·), that inhibits the number of free parameters of the model from becoming very large. For the considered model in (28) and a given difference-based state vector ∆θ, the GIC is given by:
Λi , ∆θ) is the log-likelihood function of ∆z under the ith hypothesis, which is associated with the support, Λ i , andĉ ML|i is the associated ML estimation of the state attack vector, c. Therefore, in the general case the GIC term is a function of ∆θ, which is an unknown deterministic vector. However, it will be shown that under Assumptions A.1-A.4, the suggested selection rule is independent of ∆θ and, thereby, is a proper rule. The term τ (|Λ i |, |L|) is a penalty function, which increases with the number of free unknown parameters under the ith hypothesis, i.e. the number of manipulated state variables, |Λ i |, and could be dependent on the number of load buses, |L|. In particular, two special cases of the GIC family are the minimum description length (MDL) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC), for which the penalty term is given by:
Further discussion on the penalty term is provided in the simulation study in Section V.
Based on (28) , under each hypothesis, i, the log-likelihood function of the measurements under a given ∆θ is
Continuing, the ML estimation of the state attack vector, c Λi , is found by maximizing (31) 
Hence, from (32), the ML estimator is given by:
where the last equality is obtained from the properties of projection matrices that satisfy
By substituting the ML estimator from (33) in (31), we obtain
From the properties of projection matrices, it can be verified (see, e.g. p. 46 in [58] ) that 
In conclusion, substituting (36) into (35) gives
By substituting (34) and (37) into (29), we obtain that the GIC for the selection of the set of attacked buses is based on choosing the hypothesis which maximizes
w.r.t. i = 0, 1, . . . , |G Kc |. Since the term
is independent of the hypothesis, i.e. not a function of Λ i , we conclude that the GIC rule from (38) can be obtained by choosing the hypothesis which maximizes
i = 0, 1, . . . , |G Kc |. For the null hypothesis, in which Λ 0 = ∅, we use the convention that P Λ0 ∆z L = 0.
It can be seen from the GIC in (39) that the selected hypothesis is the one that maximizes the sum of the two terms: 1) the projection of the load measurements onto the associated "attack subspace", i.e. col(H L,Λi ), by computing P Λi ∆z L ; and 2) a penalty function, −τ (|Λ i |, |L|), that keeps the attack sparse. By using (9) and the invariant property of the ML estimation [59] , the estimated attack in the ith hypothesis is given by:
In addition, by substituting (20) and (33) into (40) we obtain
Finally, by substituting (41) in (39) the GIC term can be written as
Thus, an alternative interpretation for the GIC is that it directly measures and compares the estimated unobservable FDI attack under each of the hypotheses, while considering a penalty function that encourages sparse solutions. The proposed structural-constrained GIC algorithm for the identification of unobservable FDI attacks is provided in Algorithm 1. Detection of unobservable FDI attacks is obtained as a by-product of the identification procedure. Depending on the hypothesis selected by the structural-constrained GIC in Algorithm 1, for the given measurements ∆z L , the proposed structural-constrained GIC-based detector decides that there is no attack if s = 0, that is, the null hypothesis, H 0 , is selected. Otherwise, for s = 0, the presence of an unobservable FDI attack is detected.
C. PSSE in the presence of unobservable FDI attacks
In this subsection, we develop the PSSE in the presence of unobservable FDI attacks, based on the identification results from the Subsection III-B. In the previous subsections, we used the difference-based model from (15), which contains the relevant information for identification and detection 
where P Λi is defined in (20) . 2) select the hypothesis s if
Output: selected hypothesis: s (difference-based model with only the load measurements). In this subsection, we use the full model of the two consecutive power measurement vectors directly at times t and t + 1, z t , z t+1 , both of which satisfy (10) as described in the following.
According to Assumption A.1, the measurement vector at time t is free of malicious attacks. Thus, it is obtained by substituting c = 0 in (10):
Therefore, the WLS estimator of the state at time t, θ t , can be obtained similarly to the derivation of the conventional PSSE given in (5)- (6) , which results in
Similarly, the measurement vector at time t + 1 is obtained by substituting an attack with an arbitrary contribution, c, which is not necessarily zero in (10) , to obtain
It should be noted that by subtracting (43) from (45) and substituting ∆θ = θ t+1 − θ t and ∆e = e t+1 −e t in the result, we obtain
where ∆z is the difference-based measurement vector in (14) . From (43) , (45) , and (46), the attack component Hc is the same in z t+1 and ∆z. Accordingly, we use the differencebased model to estimate the state attack vector as described in (40) and subtract the estimated attack from the measurement vector in (45) , in order to obtain "clean measurements" at time t + 1, z t+1 − H :,Λs c ML|s Λs .
Then, similarly to the development of the WLS estimator in (5)-(6), the WLS estimator of θ t+1 , based on (45) and (47), can be developed to obtain
In particular, when the identification output implies that there is no attack, i.e. s = 0 and accordingly Λ s=0 = ∅, the WLS estimator of θ t+1 is given bŷ
IV. LOW-COMPLEXITY IDENTIFICATION METHODS
According to Assumption A.3, the cardinality of the set that includes all optional supports associated with unobservable FDI attacks is
As a result, the number of hypotheses in (28) increases exponentially with the number of buses, |V|, and the maximal sparsity level, K c . Thus, the implementation of the structuralconstrained GIC in Algorithm 1 requires an exhaustive search that includes the evaluation of the GIC test from (39) for all candidate models, i.e. for any hypothesis H i ; i = 1, . . . , |G Kc |. Therefore, the proposed structural-constrained based GIC approach is impractical for large power systems.
In this section, we develop two low-complexity methods: 1) an OMP-based method [52] that relies on Assumptions A.1-A.4; and 2) a novel method that exploits the graph Markovian property of order two between the nodes (buses) in the graph representation of the power system [53] .
A. OMP method
The OMP algorithm in [52] is an efficient method for the recovery of a sparse signal. The basic principle behind the OMP algorithm is to iteratively find the support set of the sparse vector. The OMP method proceeds by finding the column of the compressed sensing (CS) matrix that correlates most strongly with the signal residual. The residual is constructed in each iteration by projecting the measurements onto the linear space spanned by the remaining columns, i.e. the columns that were not selected in previous iterations.
In this subsection, we apply the OMP algorithm for the sparse recovery of the state attack vector, c, which is a sparse signal as described in Assumption A.3, from the measurements in (15) . It should be noted that the measurement model in (15) contains a nuisance parameter vector, H L,: ∆θ, which is not a part of the conventional sparse model. Nevertheless, we justify the use of the OMP algorithm by showing that under the structural and sparse constraints, defined in Assumptions A.1-A.4, the nuisance parameter has a minor affect that can be neglected.
The main iteration of the OMP algorithm performed on the load measurements model from (15) is given as follows. Suppose Λ (j) is the estimated support set of c in the jth iterative step. In the j + 1th iteration, we compute
where Pk is obtained by replacing Λ i =k in (20) , and
Algorithm 2: Structural-constrained OMP Input:
• difference-based measurements: ∆z • network parameters: H, V, L • maximal sparsity level: K c • stopping rule threshold: γ OMP Initialization: fix j = 0 and set the temporary solution and signal residual to:
Main iteration: increment j (up to K c ) and apply 1) maximization: find k such that k = arg max k∈V ||Pkr SC-OMP|(j−1) || 2
2) stopping rule: if ||P k r OMP|(j−1) || 2 < γ OMP set j = j − 1 and stop 3) update support: compute
is the signal residual at the jth iteration. By substituting (52) and P ⊥ Λ (j) = I − P Λ (j) on the r.h.s. of (51) we obtain
By limiting the number of iterations to the maximal sparsity level K c we obtain that Λ (j) ∈ G Kc . Therefore, under Assumptions A.1-A.4 and from (26) , the nuisance parameter contribution to the load measurements, H L,: ∆θ, has a minor influence on the terms P k ∆z L and P Λ (j) ∆z L . As a result, the nuisance parameter has a minor influence on (53) , and can be neglected in the OMP selection procedure in (51) . The proposed structural-constrained OMP algorithm for the identification of unobservable FDI attacks is provided in Algorithm 2.
Although the OMP algorithm is used in a wide variety of applications, it has no optimal signal recovery guarantees. In addition, high performance by the OMP algorithm is usually obtained by using an incoherent dictionary [42] , where in our case, the CS matrix, i.e. the topology matrix H L,: , may be highly correlated forcing high mutual coherence for the CS matrix. Therefore, in the following subsection, we present an alternative approach, in which we develop a novel lowcomplexity method that uses the power system graph representation Markovian properties.
B. Graph Markovian low-complexity GIC (GM-GIC)
The power system can be represented as a weighted undirected graph, G = (V, E, Y), where the set of vertices, V, is the set of buses (generators, loads, or 'zero loads') and the edge set, E, is the set of transmission lines between these buses. Each transmission line, (k, m) ∈ E, connects two buses, m ∈ V and k ∈ V, and is characterized by the reactance value, Y k,m > 0, which is considered as a weight in the associated graphical model. In this subsection, by using the graphical representation of the power system, we develop the graph Markovian low-complexity GIC (GM-GIC) method for the identification of unobservable FDI attacks. The GM-GIC method is based on the fact that the graphical model of the power system has a second order Markov property with respect to the graph [53] and is described in detail in the following.
We consider the measurement model in (15)- (16) , where Λ ⊂ V is the true support of the state attack vector. The attack in (16) can be decomposed as follows:
where the matrix E k has a single nonzero element [E k ] k,k = 1. We define the the attack on node k ∈ Λ as
That is, the attack a L can be represented as a sum of the influences inflicted by the single nodes that belong to the support Λ. The projection of the attack on node k ∈ Λ, a k L , onto the measurement subspace associated with node m ∈ V, col(H L,m ), is
In addition, for any two buses (vertices), k and m, the geodesic distance [60] between them, d(k, m), is defined as the minimum number of edges one would have to traverse in order to get from one bus to the other. In the Appendix it is proved that for the considered model, in which the measurement noise is Gaussian, the following properties are obtained:
and
The proof is based on the graph Markovian property that the noises of the power measurements of any pair of nonadjacent nodes are conditionally independent given the remaining noise values [53] . The result in (57) implies that the attack on node k, defined in (55), does not affect the measurement subspace associated with node m if the geodesic distance between the nodes is larger than 2. In addition, (58) implies that the attack influence on the attacked node k is equal to or higher than the influence of the attack (on node k) on a different node m.
Based on the results in (57) and (58), we propose a fourstage algorithm. In the first stage of the GM-GIC method, we apply a single bus detector on the measurements in (15) in order to extract a reduced set composed of suspicious nodes: where according to (20) :
and ρ is a user defined threshold. Now, let us assume that there is only an attack on a single node, Λ = k ∈ V. According to (26) , for an attack at node k, the projected measurement vector on the subspace col(H L,m ) can be approximated by
Now, let m be an element in S, that is, P m ∆z in (61) is larger than a threshold, ρ. From (57)-(58), the probability Pr(m ∈ Λ) is larger than Pr(k ∈ Λ, 1 ≤ d(k, m) ≤ 2), where there is a single attack at node k. Similarly, the probability Pr(k ∈ Λ, 1 ≤ d(k, m) ≤ 2) is larger than Pr(k ∈ Λ, d(k, m) > 2) in this scenario. Moreover, for nodes with a geodesic distance, d(·, ·), from an attacked node that is larger than 2, the probability of being larger than the threshold, i.e. Pr(k ∈ Λ, d(k, m) > 2), is small and only depends on the noise distribution. Thus, we can expect that if a node belongs to the set S, then it is most likely to be an attacked node, or, with a lower likelihood, the node is a second-order or first-order neighbor of an attacked node. In addition, it is shown in [61] that each node in the power system network is connected to 2 − 5 nodes. Therefore, under Assumption A.3 (state sparsity), and for a reasonable threshold value, ρ, the cardinality of the suspicious set S can be bounded by
Since the maximal sparsity level K c is significantly smaller than the number of nodes in the network, i.e. K c << |V|, then, |S| can be assumed to be significantly smaller than |V|. Thus, the computational complexity of searching among the set S for attacked buses is much smaller than the complexity of searching in V.
In the second stage of the GM-GIC method, we divide S into disjoint sets, {S q } Q q=1 . To this end, we define the second-order neighborhood of a node k by
and divide S in the the following manner. If node k is in the subset S q , then node m is in the same subset, m ∈ S q , if and only if
(64) As a result, elements in different subsets, S 1 and S 2 must obtain
That is, ∀k ∈ S q and ∀m ∈ S r , q = r, an attack on node k does not affect node m and vice versa. A detailed algorithm for the partition of S into disjoint subsets {S q } Q q=1 is described in Algorithm 3. 
5) set
Outputs:
• number of subsets:
In the third stage of the GM-GIC method, we apply the structural-constrained GIC in Algorithm 1 on each of the subsets as a separate network. The main difference between this stage and the structural-constrained GIC algorithm in Algorithm 1 is the set of possible state attack vector supports, G Kc , as defined in (13) , which is significantly reduced by replacing V with S q . By denotingΛ q as the output of Algorithm 1 applied on the subset S q , the joint estimated support that includes all the separate results of applying Algorithm 1 on each subset, is obtained bŷ
(66)
In the fourth stage of the GM-GIC method the estimated support in (66) is corrected to satisfy |Λ GM-GIC | ≤ K c . That is, if the number of elements inΛ GM-GIC is higher than the maximal sparsity level, K c , then we keep only the K c elements inΛ GM-GIC with the highest influence, i.e. the highest absolute values, in the state attack ML estimation,ĉ ML|î Λ GM-GIC , obtained by substituting Λ i =Λ GM-GIC in (33) . Therefore, by sortingĉ ML|î Λ GM-GIC in a descending order, i.e.
the estimated support is obtained bŷ
The proposed GM-GIC algorithm for the identification of unobservable FDI attacks is provided in Algorithm 4.
V. SIMULATIONS In this section, the performance of the proposed methods is demonstrated for the tasks of detection and identification of unobservable FDI attacks and for the task of PSSE in the presence of these attacks. The simulations are conducted on the IEEE-30 bus test case, where the topology matrix and measurement data are extracted using the Matpower toolbox for Matlab [62] . In the remainder of this section the simulation set-up is defined in Subsection V-A, while the proposed method's performance is demonstrated in Subsection V-B.
A. Set-up 1) Measurements: The simulation study is conducted on the difference-based model in (14) . For the sake of simplicity of implementation, we ensure Assumption A.2, by defining the setṼ to include only state variables that are related to load measurements, and then restricting the support of the state attack vector by Λ ⊆Ṽ. In each simulation, we set the cardinality of the state attack support vector by |Λ| = K a and draw the support vector, Λ, uniformly from the set {Λ ∈Ṽ : |Λ| = K a }. The attack coefficients on the chosen support are randomly drawn from the continuous uniform distribution over the interval [−1, 1]. Then, the coefficients are uniformly scaled to obtain a desired value of the normalized attack norm, ||a|| Ka . From (43) , (45) , and (46), the differential state vector is obtained by, ∆θ = θ t+1 − θ t . The state vector at time t, θ t , is set to the values in the IEEE test case [62] . In order to ensure Assumption A.4, the state vector at time t + 1, θ t+1 , is simulated, based on the measurements at time t, by first updating only the load measurement with random scaling:
and then computing θ t+1 by the rundcpf(·) Matpower command in [62] . In addition, throughout the simulations, the noise is modeled as in (10) with σ 2 e = 0.01.
Algorithm 4: GM-GIC Input:
• difference-based measurements: ∆z • network parameters: H, V, L • maximal sparsity level: K c • energy threshold: ρ Algorithm Steps:
1) stage 1 (prescreening):
• compose the set:
where P m is described in (60) .
• if S = ∅: then setΛ GM-GIC = ∅ and stop 2) stage 2 (partition): divide S into disjoint subsets {S q } Q q=1 by Algorithm 3 3) stage 3 (support estimation):
• for q = 1 : Q create candidate state attack support sets:
ML|î Λ GM-GIC by (33) . • sort by descending order:
• update estimated support:
Output: estimated support: Λ s =Λ GM-GIC 2) Methods: The proposed methods include the structuralconstrained GIC method, developed in Section III and denoted by GIC, and the low-complexity methods in Section IV, i.e. the structural-constrained OMP, denoted by OMP, and the GM-GIC methods. The tuning function for the GIC and GM-GIC methods defined in (39) is set to be
where ζ and γ GIC are user defined regularization parameters and δ[·] is the Kronecker delta function. The term ζ|Λ i | is set to encourage sparse solutions for the identification problem, while the term γ GIC δ(|Λ i |) is set to maintain a desired false alarm rate for the detection problem. The detection performance of the proposed methods is compared with the following existing methods, which were modified to the difference-based model in (14): 1) the BDD detector, obtained by substituting (5) and z = ∆z in (8); 2) the energy detector, denoted by ENG, obtained by substituting z = ∆z in (12); and 3) the GFT-based detector obtained by substituting θ = ∆θ in Algorithm 1 in [40] . All numerical results were obtained using at least 500 Monte Carlo simulations. In addition, the detection thresholds were computed from simulated historic data obtained by 500 simulations of (14) under the null hypothesis H 0 .
B. Simulations -IEEE-30 bus system
For the IEEE-30 bus test case, it can be verified that the setṼ, which is defined in Subsection V-A, is V = {14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20} . The probability of false alarm is set to P F A = 0.05 unless stated otherwise. Furthermore, by selecting the AIC in (30) , the GIC tuning parameter in (70) is set to ζ = 2. The maximal sparsity rate is set to K c = 6.
1) Detection: In order to evaluate the detection performance, we consider the IEEE-30 bus system with an attack on three state variables, K a = 3. The normalized norm of the attack is set to ||a|| Ka = 0.08 and the loads scaling variation in (69) is set to σ 2 S = 0.01. The receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves of the different detectors are presented in Fig.  2 for this scenario. It can be seen that the performance of the proposed low-complexity methods, GM-GIC, and OMP, converge to those of the GIC method. In addition, the proposed methods significantly outperform the existing methods: GFT, ENG, and BDD. The BDD method resembles a detector with a random choice, i.e. it is no better than flipping a coin, as expected from the analysis of unobservable FDI attacks in Subsection II-C. 2) Identification: The identification of an unobservable FDI attack, i.e. the recovery of the state attack vector true support, Λ, is measured by the capability to classify each state variable as manipulated or not. Therefore, we evaluate the identification performance by the F-score classification metric [63] :
where Λ is the true support of the state attack vector, c. The terms t p , f p , and f n , are the true-positive, false-positive, and false-negative probabilities, respectively. The F-score metric takes values between 0 and 1, where the value 1 means perfect identification.
The F-score of the GIC, GM-GIC, and OMP methods is presented versus the normalized attack norm, ||a|| Ka , for K a = 4 in Fig. 3 (top) and versus the number of attacked elements, K a , for ||a|| Ka = 0.3 in Fig. 3 (bottom) . Both figures include two cases of the load scaling variation parameter, σ 2 s = 0.05 and σ 2 s = 0.1. It can be seen in Fig. 3 (top) that for all methods the F-score increases as the normalized attack, ||a|| Ka , increases. In addition, all methods have a higher F-score for lower load scaling variation. The proposed GIC method has the highest F-score of all studied methods, and the GM-GIC method outperforms the OMP method. In Fig. 3 (bottom) it can be seen that for all the methods the F-score decreases as K a increases. That is, smaller attacks are easier to identify. Furthermore, the GIC method shows the best performance and the GM-GIC method outperforms the OMP method for any choice of K a . 
3) PSSE:
The mean-squared-error (MSE) of the PSSE in (48)- (49) , where the attack is estimated by the methods GIC, GM-GIC, and OMP, is presented in Fig. 4 versus the normalized attack norm, ||a|| Ka , and is compared to the conventional PSSE by the WLS estimator in (5) . The simulation parameters are the same as those of in Fig. 3 . It can be seen that for all methods the MSE increases as the normalized attack, ||a|| Ka , increases. In addition, the conventional PSSE has a much higher MSE than the MSE obtained by the proposed methods. Similarly to the identification performance, the GIC method has the best performance and the GM-GIC method outperforms the OMP method. Fig. 4 . PSSE in the presence of unobservable FDI attacks: The MSE rate versus the normalized attack norm ||a|| Ka for σ 2 s = 0.05, 0.1. Fig. 5 , the averaged run-time is presented versus the number of nodes attacked, K a . It can be seen that the GIC method requires the highest run-time in a significant manner w.r.t. the low complexity GM-GIC and OMP methods. In addition, the GM-GIC method requires more run-time than the OMP method, where both methods can be executed in less than one second for the presented cases. Thus, the required run-time for both low complexity methods can be considered feasible for the identification task. Therefore, although the GIC method shows the best performance w.r.t. the identification and PSSE task, its complexity precludes it from being a practical method for larger networks. 
4) Run-time: In
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduce novel methods for the identification of unobservable FDI attacks. This is implemented by defining structural constraints on both the attack and the typical load change, formulating, based on the constraints, the identification problem as a model selection problem, and solving the selection problem using the GIC rule. As byproducts of the identification process, the proposed method also provides the detection of unobservable FDI attacks and enables the PSSE under the presence of these attacks. Since the identification process is solved by an NP-hard optimization problem, we propose two low-complexity methods: 1) an OMP based method that relies on the proposed structural and sparse constraints; and 2) the novel GM-GIC method that exploits the graph Markovian property of order two of the graph representation of power systems. We show by simulations that the proposed methods outperform existing detection methods. In addition, simulation results confirm that the proposed GIC, GM-GIC and OMP methods are feasible for the identification of unobservable attacks and for PSSE in the presence of these attacks. In addition, simulations show that the PSSE conducted by the proposed methods significantly reduces the estimation error in comparison to the standard WLS estimation. Furthermore, for both identification and PSSE the low-complexity GM-GIC method shows better results than the OMP method and is close in performance to the GIC method. It is shown that both the GM-GIC and the OMP methods require a short run-time that is feasible for power systems.
APPENDIX A
In Proposition 1 in [53] it was shown that under the assumption that the powers injected in the nodes are Gaussian and mutually independent, the topology matrix columns satisfy
Similarly, it can be shown that the subtopology matrix associated with the load buses' columns satisfy 
Then, by substituting (74) in (75) we obtain (57) . Similarly, by substituting k = m in (56), we obtain a k,k = P k a k L , ∀k ∈ V.
By substituting (54) in (76) and then using the property in (23) we obtain a k,k = a k L , ∀k ∈ V.
From the properties of projection matrices it can be verified (see Theorem 2.22, p.46 in [58] ) that ||P m a k L || ≤ ||a k L ||, ∀k, m ∈ V.
By substituting (56) in (78) we obtain (58) .
